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Abstract 
 
The importance of e-government (EG) has been widely recognized. However, we know little 
about the civil servants’ collective actions in EG development. This paper examines the 
collective action problems of getting civil servants to cooperating in EG developing process, 
to understand the so-called “free-riding” behavior of servants. In particularly, we propose 
that information literacy is a critical factor that may significantly affect whether civil servants 
behave cooperatively. Drawing on a case study of Kaohsiung City, Taiwan, the structural 
dimension of collective actions is examined. The preliminary findings of the study show that 
the servants’ information literacies influence on the structural dimension of cooperative 
behaviors negatively, in turn the emerged collective action problems deleterious the efforts for 
EG development. The implications of the lessons learned are also discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
E-government (EG) provides public services to gain and retain competitiveness in a complex 
and turbulent global political environment (Welch and Wong, 2001). Essentially, EG is using 
the Internet and other information and communication technologies (ICTs) as enablers to 
deliver public services in a smarter way, improve citizen-state relations, and transform the 
scope of administrative actions and the political processes. Indeed, government on-line 
provides a foundation for richer public dialogue and greater citizen input (Alexander, 2000). 
Although the development of EG is still ongoing, the administrative-focus has gradually 
shifted from web pages to a customer-focus, serving citizens and trading partners directly by 
providing services, information and transactions on-line via the Internet (Devadoss et al., 
2002). Under these circumstances, seeking efficient EG development is now of critical 
importance for all governments. 
 
In pursuing “many agencies, one government”, this paper argues that the civil servants’ 
cooperative behaviors are extremely important to facilitate the EG development efficiently. 
Here, cooperation refers to the actor’s cooperative motives of working toward a common goal 
(Chen et al., 1998). From a collective viewpoint, Olson’s (1965) classic book, The Logic of 
Collective Action, suggested that rational self-interested individuals in large groups would 
not automatically join together to solve a collective action problem, despite it being in their 
best interest to do so. Collective action problems are situations in which individual rationality 
leads to collective irrationality (Kollock, 1998). That is, individually reasonable cooperative 
behavior leads to a situation in which everyone is worse off then they have been otherwise.  
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Collective action theories have been used in examining various micro and macro social 
phenomena such as worker resistance (Roscigno and Hodson, 2004), group heterogeneity 
(Heckathron, 1993), social capital (Rudd, 2000), social exchange (Gächter and Fehr, 2003), 
collective organizations (Barnett et al., 2000) and online social structure (Wasko & Teigland, 
2004). All these studies suggest that many of the most challenging problems we face, from 
the interpersonal to the international, are at their collective action problems (Kollock, 1998). 
However, civil servants’ cooperative behaviors and their collective actions have received the 
least research attention in the study of EG development.  
 
Moreover, since IT plays a vital part in information handling process of EG, improving 
competences of the individuals in information processing are extremely crucial (Koniger and 
Janowitz, 1995). Accordingly, this paper examines the cooperative behaviors and collective 
actions from civil servants’ information literacies (IL), which can be defined as the abilities 
to recognize information needs and identify, evaluate and use information effectively (Bruce, 
1999). We argue that civil servants may have different levels of IL and, in turn may give EG 
development different interpretations, based on their underlying assumptions, expectations 
and knowledge (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). Therefore, to understand the collective action 
problems caused by civil servants’ IL is meaningful for pursuing the efficient EG 
development.  
 
Specifically, we ask the following research questions: Have collective actions problems 
emerged in the EG development process is due to civil servants’ IL? What is the nature of 
these collective actions problems? How do these collective action problems influence the 
cooperation and development of EG? After the introduction, the next section discusses the 
background of the major research issues. This is followed by a case description. The analysis 
and findings of the study will be discussed in the penultimate section. The final section 
concludes the current work. 
 
2. Research Background 
EG employs technology, particularly the Internet, to enhance the access to and delivery of 
government information and services to citizens, businesses, government civil servants, and 
other agencies (Jaeger, 2003). Although public sectors are generally not involved in obtaining 
competitive advantage like business units, they are now often viewed as primary mechanism 
for creating more efficient and better service organizations (Rocheleau, 2000). Accordingly, 
the scope of EG has extended and many governments now establish their national 
development action plans such as e-Korea, and e-Japan to pursue information society and 
incorporate EG, e-learning, e-industry…etc. In contrast to conventional EG initiatives, these 
action plans are broader in their scopes and provide the blueprints for building the 
information society of the future.   
 
However, previous EG studies have neglected the cooperative and collective behavior 
perspective of civil servants. The importance of cooperative behavior among individuals and 
groups has been a dominant research question in the behavior science (Deutsch, 1994). In 
particularly, cooperative behaviors are said to foster positive work climates, thus promoting 
greater commitment, stability, and interpersonal effectiveness among participants (Song et al., 
1998).  From collective viewpoint, collective action refers to joint action in pursuit of a 
common objective (Okamoto, 2003). While collective action problems (or social dilemmas, 
free-rider problems) occur whenever individuals in interdependent situations face choices in 
which the maximization of short-term self-interest yields outcomes, leaving all participants 
worse off than feasible alternatives (Ostrom, 1998). That is, there is a behavior that is clearly 
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dominant, in that performing will guarantee a maximum personal outcome, regardless of 
what other do; however, if all persons act in this way, outcomes in the long run are poorer 
than they would have been had everyone cooperated (Parks et al.1996).  
 
In EG development, civil servants must be literate with computer operation and other job 
related processes. From this perspective, EG development should incorporating computer 
skills and training programs to be part of every civil servant’ working experience. Moreover, 
IL is envisaged as comprising not only “an understanding of the general concepts of 
information processing”, but also “how computer systems support and shape a person’s job 
function” and “ the trade-off between investment and benefits, time expended, and time 
saved” (Mutch, 1997). We argue that: although we recognize the potential power of EG poses 
for governmental reform, without systematic consideration of IL, civil servants cannot 
realized the potential of the Internet and in turn the emerged collective action problems 
deleterious efforts for EG development. 
 
Collective action has been studies in two largely disjoint approaches, one focusing on 
influence of social structure (macro level) and another focusing on the incentive for 
individual participation (micro level) (Chwe, 1999; Kollock 1998). Following by Kollock’s 
(1998) suggestions, there are three issues included in individual motivation dimension: social 
value orientation, communication and group identity; there are six issues included in structure 
dimension: iteration and identifiability, payoff structure, efficacy, group size, boundary and 
sanctions. Because of the limited length of the paper, the study will focus on the social 
structure dimension only. Table 1 shows the issues and descriptions for the study.  
 
Table1: Major Issues of the Structural Dimension of Collective Actions 
Critical issue Description 
Iteration and 
identifiability 
Iteration represents interactions between civil servants and the 
identifiability (also called observability, anonymity, accountability 
and task visibility) involves the degree to which others can observe 
and assess an individual’s behaviors (Wagner, 1995). If individuals 
will not interact in the future, if identity is unknown or unstable, and 
if there is no recollection or record of past interactions, individual 
will be motivated to behave selfishly because they will not be 
accountable for their actions.  
Payoff structure 
The payoff structure refers to informal rewards of individuals’ 
cooperation from others. The greater the personal return from 
cooperation and the lower the return from defecting, the higher the 
level of cooperation. 
Efficacy 
The efficacy refers to that individuals can have a noticeable effect on 
the outcomes. One of the key reasons people do not cooperate is the 
fact a single person’s actions may have no discernable effect on the 
situation. 
Group size The group size refers to the number of workers performing a task. Cooperation declines as group size increases. 
Boundary 
The boundary refers to the extent that civil employees perceive EG 
as a public good. The higher the boundary of EG, the lower the 
incentive to voluntarily contribute of developing EG. 
Sanctions 
The sanction refers to the organization’s formal reward system. The 
cooperators would be rewarded for their actions and defectors 
punished.  
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3. Methodology –The Case 
In studying EG, Taiwan is a particularly appropriate context for study because it is 
characterized by information-intensive competition and rapid technological advancements. 
According to the Global E-government Survey conducted by the World Markets Research 
Center (WMRC) in 2001 and 2002, Taiwan has been ranked as the first among 196 other 
nations in terms of the provision of on-line services (www.insidepolitics.org). The survey 
suggests that Taiwan as one of best practitioners of government web sites. We selected 
Kaohsiung City, the biggest commercial harbor and the second biggest city in Taiwan, for our 
case study.  
 
Qualitative data were gathered from document archives, face-to-face unstructured interviews, 
and field-notes. One of the authors of this paper is an civil servant of Kaohsiung city, carried 
out 20 interviews with civil servants from the Kaohsiung city government. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with the MIS and non-MIS staffs in both MIS and non-MIS 
departments at the city government. All informants shown in Table 2 were selected and 
scrutinized carefully to ensure the quality of the collected data. According to informants’ 
self-reported computer skills and educational backgrounds, we accessed their IL and assigned 
as very high, high, medium and weak, respectively. The face-to-face interviews were 
unstructured; the standard set of questions used was designed to only help initiate and guide 
the interview process. All the interviews were tape-recorded; notes were taken during the 
sessions as well. Additional observations were noted immediately after each interview was 
completed.  
 
Table 2. Background of Participants and Information Literacy 
Individual backgrounds 
Civil 
servant Sex Age 
Work 
experience Department Educational Major 
Information 
literacy 
A1 Male 46 21 MIS Computer Science Very high 
A2 Male 36 12 MIS Electronic 
Engineering 
Very high 
A3 Female 52 23 MIS Computer Science Very high 
A4 Male 34 8 MIS Electronic 
Engineering 
Very high 
B1 Female 48 21 Land Administration Math. High 
B2 Male 36 12 Urban Planning  Electronic 
Engineering 
High 
B3 Male 46 17 Civil Affairs Information 
Management 
High 
B4 Male 50 22 Labor Affairs Electronic 
Engineering 
High 
B5 Female 35 7 Transportation Computer Science High 
C1 Female 31 4 MIS History Medium  
C2 Female 28 3 MIS Business Medium 
D1 Male 42 17 Information Office Sociology Weak 
D2 Female 39 15 Secretariat Law Weak 
D3 Female 41 14 Finance General Mgt. Weak 
D4 Male 46 16 Government Ethics Tourism Weak 
D5 Female 32 5 Budget Accounting Weak 
 
885 
4. Case findings  
 
Finding 1: In EG developing process, the lower IL civil servants perceive a lower level of 
iteration and identifiability, which can lead to the collective action problems. 
 
Firstly, iteration and identifiability are considered. Previous studies (e.g., Kollock, 1998) 
suggest that if individuals will not interact in the future, if identity is unknown or unstable, 
and if there is no recollection or record of past interactions, individual will be motivated to 
behave selfishly because they will not be accountable for their actions. In our data analysis, 
several civil servants (most notably, A2, A3 and B3) stated that their jobs have recorded 
clearly, and highly interact with each other. For example, as stated by civil servants A3: “We 
feel very tired to have meetings with the staffs of The Research, Development and Evaluation 
Commission (RDEC) of our city government. The results of each meeting are recorded 
clearly, and they will trace and review our progress in the following meetings”. In contrast, 
civil servants C1 and D4 indicate that their jobs have no relevance to EG development. As 
noted by D4: “There are other departments in charge of EG adoption. We have no relevance 
about this issue”.  
 
Apparently, in EG development, an effective recoding system of civil servants’ interactions 
will motivate their cooperative behaviors, will reduce the collective action problems and 
facilitate the EG development. Since the lower IL civil servants’ jobs are not related to EG 
directly, their efforts and activities cannot be identified systematically. In turn, they don’t 
need to interact with others and have no formal records of their interactions. In this case, 
these civil servants are likely to behave selfishly and uncooperatively, and in turn will 
attenuate the collective actions.  
 
Finding 2: In EG developing process, the lower IL civil servants perceive a lower level of 
pay-off for their cooperative behaviors, which can to lead to the collective action problems. 
 
As indicated earlier, the payoff structure refers to informal rewards of individuals’ 
cooperation from others. Obviously, the greater the personal return from cooperation, the 
higher the level of cooperation (Kollock, 1998). Our analysis shows that civil servants 
(particularly A1, B1 and B2) expressed they perceived positive pay-off from their colleagues 
and other departments. For example, as indicated by civil servants A1: “Our team is in charge 
of city government’s informationization, including applications development, planning and 
consultation. Our efforts in cross-department communication have attained very positive 
feedbacks and cooperations”. Unlikely, civil servants D3, D2 and D5 indicate that they do not 
perceive positive pay-off from their colleagues and other departments. For example, as civil 
servant D2 summarized: “We don’t have our own IT/IS staffs. We do have hard time, 
because we need to do everything by ourselves. Even we win an award in promoting 
Electronic Official Document Interchange (EODI), the reward is quite minor”.  
 
Obviously, human interaction always shapes actor’s perceptions of opportunities for 
defection, and actors try to influence their neighbors (Kim and Bearman, 1997). Actors tend 
to base their decision about participation upon other’s decisions, and one’s participation tends 
to encourage other’s participation by making collective action to succeed (Kim and Bearman, 
1997). If low IL civil servants’ cannot perceive a higher level of payoff from other servants, 
they will not delight to cooperate with others and will increase the collective action problems.  
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Finding 3: In EG developing process, the lower IL of civil servants perceive a lower level 
of their contributions toward EG, which can lead to the collective action problems. 
 
Efficacy refers to that individuals can have a noticeable effect on the outcomes; if they can 
make an efficacious contribution, cooperation rates can increase (Kollock, 1998). Efficacy 
concerns whether a single person’s actions may have a discernable effect on the situation. In 
this regard, if civil servants’ can perceive the noticeable effects of EG development, the 
collective action problems are likely to decrease. Undoubtedly, effective performance 
measurement is always an issue of public bureaucracies. Our analysis suggests that civil 
servants (particularly A1, B1 and B4) expressed they perceived that their efforts can 
significantly contribute to the EG initiatives. For example, indicate by civil servants A1: “In 
EG adoption process, our department would lead the development in city government. We 
start the adoption process from our department, such as electric documents and KM system. 
In turn, other departments will mimic our successful experiences”. In contrast, civil servants 
C1, C2, D1, D2 and D3 indicate that they have no significantly contribute to the EG 
initiatives. For example, as indicate by C1: “Besides typing documents and Internet, my 
computer technique is poor! I can do noting and have no contribution in adopting EG”.  
 
Obviously, government always suffers from the absence of economic markets for outputs and 
diffused goals (Rainey, 1999), and it is difficult for each member to ascertain what returns are 
from his or her contributions. In this case, the lower IL civil servants are likely to perceived 
little contribution in EG developing process. 
 
Finding 4: In EG developing process, the lower IL civil servants perceive to be posted in a 
larger group in performing their EG related tasks, which can lead to the collective action 
problems. 
 
Researchers found that increasing the number of workers performing a task reduced the 
average individual effort devoted to task performance (Wagner, 1995). Based on this, in EG 
development, as perceived group size increase, the benefit to the individual from cooperation 
decrease. However, the groups are not necessary in formal organization structure, but also 
some informal teams in pursuing EG development. Also, group size is a quite subjective 
concept. For example, several civil servants (most notably, A2, A4, B1 and B5) stated that 
their departments are small and facilitate their cooperation in pursuing EG. As indicate by 
A2: ”We need to form and attain some small workshops and learning groups to learn new 
techniques. As you know, the learning new tech is complicate. Our colleagues will share their 
experiences, not only to extend our knowledge but get close to each other”. In contrast, civil 
servants D1 and D3 indicate that they are in a bigger department and are always to count on 
the others’ helps; they have no motivations to learn by themselves. For example, as indicate 
by D1: “We are in a large department and not everyone is good in computer techniques. 
However, some of the staffs have the capabilities to solve our problems”. 
 
Although we have no specific numbers of groups in judging their size, obviously, low IL civil 
servants are likely to perceive as be posted in a bigger department and count on others’ helps. 
Especially, as groups become large, individual contributions to the collective action tend to 
greater than the perceived individual proportion of the public goods shared by each member 
(Brito, 2001). Also, in large groups members are more likely to tolerate instances of 
non-contribution. Therefore, Olson (1965) asserts that the larger the number of members in a 
group, the less likely that the group will exhibit successful collective action. 
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Finding 5: In EG developing process, the lower IL civil servants perceive a higher level of 
the results of EG as public goods, which can lead to the collective action problems. 
 
The boundaries of collective good have an effect on collaboration. EG initiations may create 
a public good (or collective goods) of new-form government that is available to anyone in the 
government, making it easy for individuals to free-ride on the efforts of others. Two 
characteristics are associated with public goods: non-rivalry and non-excludability (Wasko 
and Teigland, 2004). Nonrival means that good that is not used up or depleted in its 
consumption, and non-execludability occurs when non-contributors cannot be excluded from 
consuming the good (Wasko and Teigland, 2004). Our analysis suggests that civil servants 
(particularly A1, A4, B1 and B2) expressed the desire to involve on the EG adoption 
processes, which means that they do not see the results of EG as public goods. As stated by 
civil servants A1: “The Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC) of city 
government don’t have any IT/IS staff in formulation EG policy. All EG initiatives are highly 
related to IT, and IT department is the window to pursue it. We need to take the 
responsibilities”. 
 
However, lower IL civil servants show that they are likely to take the results of EG as public 
goods. Although they realized that the services provided by EG are valued, no efforts have 
been made to contribute themselves in adoption EG. This was especially true for civil 
servants C2, D3, D4 and D5. As civil servants D4 said: “I have no idea about using computer. 
But, I know every one can use online government and it is quite convenient”.  
 
Olson (1965) suggested that individuals seek to reap the benefits of others’ participation 
while evading the costs to themselves because the individuals who cannot be excluded from 
the benefits of a public good have little incentive to voluntarily contribute once the good is 
produced. Therefore, if civil servants perceive a higher degree of non-rivalry and 
non-excludability, they are likely to have little incentive to voluntarily contribute of 
developing EG, thus the boundaries of collective good lead to the collective action problems.  
 
Finding 6: In EG developing process, the lower IL civil servants need a more specific 
sanction system in performing their EG related tasks, otherwise it can lead to the collective 
action problems. 
 
The last one factor is the sanction related to EG development. Unlike pay-off structure, the 
sanction refers to the organization’s formal reward system, that the cooperators would be 
rewarded for their action and defectors punished. Several civil servants (A2, A3, B2 and B3) 
expressed the sanction system for EG adoption is not strong enough, but they are happy to 
have significant awards. For example, as observed by A2: “Personally, the sanctions are still 
the major incentive for our hard work. However, it’ our duties and responsibilities to dedicate 
ourselves in EG development, no matter what awards our supervised mangers would give to 
us”. 
 
With respect to same issue, civil servants (C2, D2 and D3) more emphases that they need 
more positive feedbacks to motivate their efforts in EG adoption. Since the sanction system 
for EG adoption is not significant, the data show these civil servants are quite reactive in EG 
development. For example, civil servant D3 commented: “In pursuing Electronic Official 
Document Interchange (EODI), there is only a date for initiative. However, there is no 
compulsory of not doing. Basically, all we have to do is met the minimal requirement: to 
learn how to type official document electronically. No thing else!”   
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Sanctions are actions taken on behalf of communities to enforce laws (Whitworth and De 
Moor, 2003). However, civil servants are also more likely to be characterized by an ethic hat 
prioritizes intrinsic rewards over extrinsic rewards (Crewson, 1997). Because of the effects of 
the reward/sanction system on EG adoption, the importance of setting "right" quotas should 
be underscored. Overall, an effective sanction system will encourage all civil servants 
positively, but it has a serious impact on those low IL civil servants.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The main purpose of this research has been to seek an understanding of collective behaviors 
of civil servants in terms of their IL. Six issues in structure dimension: iteration and 
identifiability, payoff structure, efficacy, group size, boundary and sanctions have examined. 
Our study makes several contributions to the study of EG development process. First, civil 
servants’ behaviors and expectations are taken into account in EG development research. 
Civil servants who are engaged in cooperative behavior have different goals and attitudes 
toward risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). In fact, the study of collective action problems is the study of 
the tension between individual and collective rationality (Kollock, 1998) and considering 
spontaneous cooperation in a group achieved through individually rational decisions.  
 
Second, collective actions underlie many ongoing collective action problems, such as the 
functioning of large organizations and the mobilization of political movements. As suggested 
by Brito (2001), when large collectivities offer public goods as their sole incentive both the 
“imperceptible effect” and the “free-rider problem” are likely to jeopardize collective actions. 
In this context, any member acting on rational and utilitarian basis may maximize his or her 
benefits by not making any effort on behalf of the group (Brito, 2001). Since governmental 
agencies are always very big in their size, the influence of collective action problems in 
informtionization is likely more severe than private business organizations.   
 
Third, more recently, social processes that facilitate cooperation have become more 
prominent (Kollock, 1994). Besides the size of group, civil servants’ behavior is affected by 
many other structural variables, including heterogeneity of participants, their dependence on 
the benefits received, their discount rates, the type and predictability of transformation 
processes involved, the nesting of organizational levels, monitoring techniques, and the 
information available to participants. (Ostrom,1998). From this perspective, the 
understanding of collective action problems helps to promote a normative environment that 
encourages cooperation between actors, and in turn improve the efficiency of EG 
development.  
 
In short, we learned that the structural dimension of collective actions of civil servants do 
influence the efficiency of EG development. Notwithstanding, the purpose of this paper has 
not been to present generalizable solutions to those collective action problems, but to awaken 
interest in the civil servants’ IL in pursuing EG development.  
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